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No. 231/January 2011 
Single eComms market? No such thing… 
Jacques Pelkmans and Andrea Renda 
Abstract 
otwithstanding the undeniable success of telecoms liberalisation in terms of price reduction, new services and 
technologies as well as consumer satisfaction, EU telecoms policy is at least a half failure. This might seem hard 
to believe, but we show in this Policy Brief that there is no such thing as an EU telecoms (or eComms) single 
market. We provide ample empirical economic and regulatory evidence of profound and lingering fragmentation as well 
as a brief assessment of the flaws of the third eComms package of 2009, now in force. Overcoming the fragmentation 
cannot but yield a considerable welfare improvement for the Union, which is exactly what a single market should be 
expected to deliver. Doing away with the flaws in the EU system requires a better institutional design. We wonder 
whether the regulatory (and competition policy) approach is really suitable for the Union and whether the fundamental 
conflict between the EU constitutional doctrine and the building of the single market (just as much a constitutional duty!) 
should not be resolved in novel ways.  
JEL codes: F15 - Economic Integration, L51 - Economics of Regulation L96 – Telecommunications 
Introduction 
The liberalisation of telecoms (or eCommunications) 
in the EU is widely regarded as a great success. 
Tariffs and prices have decreased radically, new 
entrants have come in from all corners, new services 
have been stimulated and consumers have benefitted 
significantly from technological convergence. Of 
course, it is the combination of (more) competitive 
markets with a stream of new technology that has 
engendered these significant welfare gains.  
Therefore, it might be difficult for many readers to 
believe that EU telecoms policy is at least a half-
failure, if not worse. Recently, it took the EU three 
agonizing  years  before  a  relatively  modest  third 
 
package of telecoms policy and regulations could be 
adopted.
1 Most of the problems can be traced back to 
an underlying cause: the EU still lacks an internal 
market for e-communications. This means that, even 
if competition has developed in each and every 
member state, the fragmentation between national 
markets is usually profound, and at times extreme. 
The institutional framework and the allocation of 
tasks between the EU and national levels are simply 
not designed to accomplish what the EU must do 
under the treaty: establish a single market and ensure 
that it functions properly! 
                                                      
1 For an account of this cumbersome process, see e.g. 
Renda (2009).  
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This CEPS Policy Brief focuses on the systemic 
neglect of the internal market in e-communications. 
Section 1 summarises the current evidence on the lack 
of integration between national markets in the e-
communications sector, both with the help of many 
indicators of price disparities as well as non-price 
evidence of fragmentation. Section 2 discusses EU 
telecoms policy in the light of the fragmentation, 
especially the 2002 and 2009 telecoms regulatory 
packages (including some institutional features) and 
the recent Digital Agenda. We find painful flaws and 
omissions, so much so that there seems to be every 
reason to have serious second thoughts about the 
overall EU approach adopted so far, geared towards 
opening national markets to competition. Thus, in the 
concluding section, we wonder whether the chosen 
approach is really suitable for the future of EU e-
communications.  
1.  Economic indicators show entrenched 
fragmentation 
This section surveys available market indicators 
showing the profound fragmentation of the internal 
EU e-communications market. Empirical economic 
evidence can be usefully divided into two categories 
of data: price disparities and non-price indicators of 
fragmentation. We illustrate them separately in the 
next two subsections.  
1.1 Price  disparities   
Thirteen years after the first 1998 telecoms package, 
supposedly establishing an internal telecoms market, 
and following almost two decades of EU 
liberalisation, price disparities in the EU internal 
eComms services market are still very large and 
numerous. In a well-functioning internal market, price 
disparities might not fully disappear but they would 
be held in check over time by arbitrage and corporate 
strategies. It is an empirical matter how much scope 
for residual price disparities would remain – as 
national characteristics, also of demand, may play a 
role – but differences beyond (say) 50% between 
lowest and highest would surely attract attention of 
business players (as an opportunity to act), not to 
speak of disparities beyond 100% or more.
2  In this 
subsection, we briefly illustrate a number of price 
disparities,
3 none of which can be called relatively 
                                                      
2 Note: a disparity of 50% implies a highest/lowest ratio of 
150%; one of 100% requires a highest/lowest ratio of 
200%. 
3 Many of them have been taken from European 
Commission, 15th progress report on the single European 
electronic communications market, Staff Working 
Document SEC (2010) 630 of 25 May 2010, Volume 2. See 
Pelkmans & Renda (2011) for details, also on the other 
sources used.  
small (say, <50%) or only slightly worrying (say, < 
100%). On the contrary, all of them are far beyond 
100%, if not large multiples of 100%. 
Figure 1 collects price disparities in no less than 11 
eComms services, comprising most of the often used 
ones. Not a single one indicator amounts to less than 
50% or even less than 100%. The 'lowest' one, fully 
unbundled local loop (ULL), has a highest/lowest 
ratio of 319%, and 211% when removing the two 
outliers.  
The largest price discrepancies border on the absurd, 
certainly in an 'internal' market: international fixed 
calls to a distant EU country have a highest/lowest 
ratio of 2865% (still 1060% without the two outliers), 
fixed calls to Japan even reach an incredible 4610% 
(still 2504% without the two outliers) and leased lines 
make 1206% (still 655% without the two outliers). 
But what to think of international fixed calls overall 
(with 1077%, and still 458% without outliers), 
disparities in national fixed call charges of no less 
than 958% (510% without outliers) and shared access 
to ULLs (with 1016%, and still 565% without 
outliers)?  
And the mobile market seems little better with mobile 
voice price disparities 'enjoying' a highest/lowest ratio 
of 600% (still 420% without outliers) and call 
termination on mobile networks showing a ratio of 
622% (still 310% without outliers). In case one has 
doubts whether a snapshot of 2008-09 is appropriate 
(although the point is of course that these enormous 
disparities still persist after 20 years of liberalisation), 
note that the coefficient of variation
4 over time is just 
as worrying. For example, this coefficient remains 
high (30% plus) and constant over four years up to 
2008 for mobile interconnect tariffs, reaches some 
45% (and constant) for interconnect rates in fixed 
voice and even increases over 7 years for local calls 
(from 30% – plus).
5 We have included cross-border 
intra-EU voice roaming charges which used to be 
notoriously high everywhere as is widely known. 
With high prices high overall, one would expect price 
disparities to be muted. Figure 1 shows otherwise: 
using 2005 data (before the intrusive roaming price 
reduction regulation was proposed), the ratio is 341% 
(and 226% without outliers).  
Altogether, the conclusion is that the price 
convergence one should expect in the internal e-
communications market is simply absent. Disparities 
are so large that pursuing a well-functioning single 
market in e-communications is bound to yield great 
economic benefits.  
                                                      
4 The standard deviation divided by the mean.  
5 European Commission, 15th progress report on the single 
European electronic communications market, op. cit.  
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Figure 2. Average monthly expenditure, business users 
(a) Composite basket       (b) High-usage basket 
 
Source: Pelkmans & Renda (2011). 
 
Figure 3. Broadband performance index, July 2009 
 
Source: Pelkmans & Renda (2010). 
 
Although non-price indicators are typically less 
straightforward than the ones showing price 
disparities, the few examples provided here
8 raise at 
the very least a serious suspicion of profound 
fragmentation for legal, competition, behavioural and 
infrastructure reasons. Together with the powerful 
empirical evidence emerging from huge price 
disparities – and this after so many years of EU 
telecoms liberalisation – one is compelled to conclude 
that the internal e-communications market has been 
seriously neglected, to the detriment of the European 
economy, and against the spirit if not the letter of the 
treaty.  
                                                      
8 Amongst the other illustrations provided in Pelkmans & 
Renda (2011), one should be mentioned here: cross-border 
intra-EU internet purchases and B2B cross-border e-
commerce remain dramatically behind domestic activities 
and this is not due to a myopic attitude in European 
business or consumers. See also section 2.3.  
2.  Single market fragmentation and EU 
telecoms policy 
Although several aspects of telecommunications 
policy are likely to support economic growth – an 
overarching economic goal of the TFEU ever since 
the Rome Treaty – the treaty logic for EU action in 
this field is mainly focused on creating the paramount 
‘means’ to promote this aim, namely, the internal 
market. Very little can be done at the EU level to 
boost economic growth through the development of a 
true information society, if it is not linked to the 
internal market objective. Indeed, the legal basis for 
much of EU e-communications regulation is Art. 114 
TFEU (formerly Art. 95 EC), the pivotal internal 
market article. There is a close link with Art. 106, 
TFEU (former Art. 86, EC) associated with EU 
competition policy for network industries. Although 
Art. 106, TFEU is found in the competition chapter of 
the treaty, too often it is overlooked that the internal 
market and competition policy are acting hand-in-Single eComms Market? No such thing… | 5 
glove here, basically being inseparable.
9 Put simply, 
the idea of the treaty competition chapter is neither to 
promote competition in general, nor competition in 
‘national’ markets, but competition in the internal 
market.
10 In order to do so, the internal market has to 
be established first. Since the market remains deeply 
fragmented, as shown, there are compelling grounds 
for acting to overcome this fragmentation as an 
intermediate goal. Only when this intermediate goal, a 
well-functioning internal e-communications market, 
has been achieved, can it serve as the 'means' to serve 
the higher aims of the treaty, especially (additional) 
economic growth. It follows that the overcoming of 
fragmentation  cannot but  deserve priority over any 
other EU action in this field. This is what the treaty 
mandates the Commission, Council and the European 
Parliament to achieve.  
The problem is systemic and far from new. Some 
analysts already highlighted the absence of legal 
provisions that would help achieve the Internal 
Market for e-communications in the late 1990s. For 
example, Pelkmans &Young (1998) argued that there 
were “lingering doubts about (…) a single telecoms 
market”.
11 A few years later, during the co-decision 
procedure that led to the approval of the 2002 
package, a CEPS report authored by Martin Cave and 
Pierre Larouche (2001) noted that the “integration of 
national markets into an internal market remains a 
dark spot in the track record of telecoms 
liberalization”. The report also expressed concern that 
“the internal market will remain forgotten – or 
ignored – in the new regulatory framework”. Even the 
member states' officials preparing the 2002 package in 
Council admitted that the internal market was never at 
the centre of attention during those days. So, it is no 
surprise that the (former) Commissioner for the 
Information Society Viviane Reding observed in 
2007: “Two decades after we started to open national 
markets formerly dominated by state-owned 
monopolies, to competition, we still do not have an 
internal market for telecoms.” And the new 
Commissioner in charge of the Digital Agenda, Neelie 
Kroes, was even tougher on the issue, as she recently 
stated at the 2010 Mobile World Congress: “Europe is 
                                                      
9 Indeed, Art. 106, TFEU says "… neither enact nor 
maintain in force any measure contrary to rules contained 
in the Treaties, in particular…" non-discrimination and the 
competition rules. (emphasis added, the authors).  
10 This is clear from Art. 3(b), TFEU dealing with exclusive 
competences. The exclusive competence of the Union is 
defined as "competition rules necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market". Protocol 27 adds encouragement to 
this. Nowhere in the treaties, old or new, is there any 
provision instructing the EU to exercise its powers to 
promote, let alone, ensure, competition in national (e-
communications) markets. 
11 See Pelkmans & Young (1998) and Pelkmans (1998).  
still a patchwork of national markets. We no longer 
have queues of lorries at frontiers but we are still very 
far from achieving a Digital Single Market.” 
The present section provided a brief account of recent 
developments in the e-communications regulation and 
competition policy, with a view to their actual or 
potential contribution in realizing the digital internal 
market. A genuine internal market would not only 
further boost productivity and growth in the near 
future for existing services and infrastructure, but also 
be likely to greatly motivate large-scale investment 
and other dynamic adaptations in order to benefit 
effectively from new technologies, broadband 
services and the potential of high-quality IP-based 
infrastructure, engendering a higher growth path for 
many years to come (see e.g. Micus Consulting, 
2008). This is indeed the ‘workhorse’ function of the 
internal market in the treaty and the principal reason 
for its pivotal place in European integration.  
Section 2.1 below looks at some critical problems 
linked to the internal market that remained unresolved 
by the second telecoms package of 2002. Section 2.2 
discusses, in short, the Commission’s proposals 
preceding the third package with respect to the 
internal market and their resolution (or not) in the 
third telecoms package of December 2009. Section 
2.3 touches upon the main internal market aspects in 
the Commission's Digital Agenda of May 2010.
12  
2.1  Why the 2002 telecoms regime did 
not realise an internal market 
The 2002 telecoms regime did not bring the EU 
internal market much closer. Without being 
exhaustive, we provide five reasons why this was so. 
First, not only was the ‘national markets approach’ 
maintained: the fragmentation was in fact ‘hardened’ 
by compelling the national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs) to work on an ambitious and loaded agenda 
of (national) market analysis – more than 500, all in 
all – and subsequent remedies, with a possible 
Commission veto on those analyses. By-passing the 
three-criteria test on whether ex-ante regulation was 
the proper action to take, national markets almost 
invariably became regulated without appropriate 
economic analysis necessarily supporting that move, 
leaving a huge gap in the ‘better regulation’ 
dimension of the package (see Renda, 2008 and De 
Streel, 2008). The lingering dominance of incumbents 
is also likely to harden the fragmentation. Indeed 
when studying the remaining seven markets, left over 
after the revision of the 18 pre-defined ‘relevant’ 
                                                      
12 Note that length constraints prevent this CEPS Policy 
Brief from treating many of these relevant aspects in-depth. 
For a more elaborate discussion, readers are referred to 
Pelkmans & Renda (2011).  6 | Pelkmans & Renda 
markets in December 2007, it turns out that all 
member states feature a player with significant market 
power (SMP) in almost all of them. Given the 
upcoming transition to next-generation-access 
networks (NGANs), which is likely to require higher 
access prices (and fewer access points), there is a risk 
that service competition may suffer and entrants will 
decline in number, without facilities-based 
competition having taken off in non-cable countries.  
Second, even if the digital internal market is 
fragmented due to an approach rooted in ‘national’ 
markets, one could argue that convergence between 
member states in their regulatory and antitrust 
approaches would at least trigger a level-playing field 
and greater convergence of market conditions, thus 
mimicking EU-wide allocative benefits for 
consumers, business users and operators themselves 
when acting across borders. However, the lack of a 
Commission’s veto power on remedies under the Art. 
7 procedure led to considerable inconsistencies 
precisely where they matter most, yielding differences 
in market definition, in the choice of cost parameters 
and access price models, in the implementation of 
remedies and in appeals procedures. Furthermore, the 
fact that some EU countries have introduced 
'functional separation' whereas others have not might 
also be regarded as an additional element of 
fragmentation for potential new entrants wishing to 
operate in more than one member state.  
Third, the internal market risks becoming further 
fragmented, too, due to a series of problems with 
infrastructure investment. Such investments are costly 
and subject to economies of scale and scope. Keeping 
it simple, it is about investment in high-quality DSL 
(digital subscriber line) or, going beyond it, to very-
high-speed infrastructure like fibre or adjusted cable. 
Since the ladder-of-investment has proven to be of 
doubtful effectiveness, EU rates of infrastructure 
investment in telecoms have often remained below the 
OECD average (depending on the EU country) up to 
the crisis. All this led to the emergence of a 
‘broadband gap’ (Figure 3) which makes it even 
harder for economic operators to embark on European 
strategies, whilst the European consumer is faced with 
radically different opportunities and benefits 
depending on where (s)he resides. Importantly, 
divergences between national remedies may well be 
exacerbated with the transition to NGA networks, as 
national governments and regulators have come up 
with a wide array of approaches to remedies, ranging 
from the forced sharing of in-building wires to duct-
sharing to access to dark fibre, or bitstream access in a 
limited number of member states.  
Fourth, NRAs tended to turn inward
13 whilst paying 
scant attention to soft cooperative processes at EU 
level. The exchange of good practices and guidance in 
the European Regulators Group or ERG (the network 
of NRAs) appeared far too soft. The alternative route 
of (more) centralisation never seemed to be 
considered as a realistic option. The straightforward 
notion that a single telecoms market requires a single 
and authoritative regulator (as indeed in every other 
telecoms market in every OECD country and in many 
other countries in the world) has been rejected in 
reports and studies commissioned by the European 
Commission between 1995 and 2006. The NRAs as a 
group never made up for this 'regulatory gap' at the 
EU level: they did not show much of an urge to 
improve the working of the hopelessly fragmented EU 
market, since their procedures and resolve were weak 
at best. The mere existence of NRAs and the 
hardening of domestic tasks and orientation have 
created huge vested interests in pre-empting a 
common EU regulator.  
They are helped by the constitutional taboo on 
establishing an independent EU regulator in (any) 
network industries, the so-called ‘Meroni doctrine’. If 
an EU Agency would be created, it might have 
modest powers but it cannot become an independent 
regulatory authority. The Commission or a 
comitology committee (with the member states in it) 
will always have to stand above it and assume 
ultimate responsibility for decisions. The de facto 
influence of some existing EU Agencies in other 
domains shows that the approval by the Commission 
or comitology can be turned into a formality but even 
that option seems far off in e-communications 
markets. For the European Parliament, with its 
gradually increased powers over time and again in the 
Lisbon Treaty, a truly independent EU Agency is 
equally unattractive since it will tend to take away 
powers that have only recently been bestowed upon it. 
Thus, for legal and political reasons, the governance 
structure, which should help the proper functioning of 
the internal e-communications market, is actually 
about the worst one can envisage: neither an 
independent EU Agency for the EU market as a 
whole, nor an autonomous EU Agency with modest 
but real powers, nor an effective (even when merely 
coordinating) ERG nor a European Commission 
which can reach into national markets deep enough or 
begin to erode the ‘national’ market approach in the 
first place.  
                                                      
13 Note the Commission's remark when presenting the third 
package proposals: “[The NRAs’]…perspective has largely 
remained confined to national borders, despite the efforts 
made to improve coordination via the European Regulators 
Group" (COM(2007)696 of 13 November 2007). Single eComms Market? No such thing… | 7 
Fifth, the EU level has next to nothing to say on 
‘spectrum’. In the aftermath of the second package, 
this has grown into an ever more costly omission and 
this cost is likely to increase to much higher levels in 
the near future. Why? The principal reason is wireless 
broadband, which is expected to be subject to 
significant technological progress, such that 4G (4
th 
generation) wireless technologies (like LTE, the latest 
standard in the mobile network technology tree) can 
become genuine alternatives to fixed broadband with 
fairly high speeds. This opportunity is of particular 
importance for non-cable countries since platform-
based competition would thus become possible in 
broadband, more or less like in cable countries. To 
seize this opportunity, scarce spectrum has to be made 
available. Fortunately, there is a unique window of 
opportunity with the transition from analogue to 
digital broadcasting which requires far less spectrum. 
This ‘digital dividend’ – freeing broadcasting 
frequencies for wireless – has been fiercely opposed 
by European broadcasters, if only to pre-empt new 
competitors in national markets. It would be good for 
technological progress and the internal market (the 
two would interact) if the European Commission 
could mandate the spectrum transition and not the 
member states separately, as is the case today.  
2.2  Did the 2009 e-Comms package 
bring the single market forward? 
The European Commission made proposals for a third 
telecoms package in November 2007. All the 
proposals amounted to an adaptation of the second 
package, refining and improving the competition-
policy inspired regulatory regime in national markets. 
Falling outside this framework, the Commission also 
proposed strict EU-wide price controls for cross-
border roaming, a uniquely intrusive measure after 
telcos proved unable or unwilling to solve the 
problem of excessive pricing via self-regulation. 
There can be little doubt that, by 2007, the 
Commission had begun to realize that the internal e-
communications market was still nowhere and that it 
deserved greater priority. Two queries are therefore 
relevant: do these proposals bring the internal market 
forward and did the Commission get its way? 
Unfortunately, the answer to both queries is rather 
disappointing: the proposals would not have brought 
the single market forward very much and precisely 
where these would have been helpful, the 
Commission harvested few useful results in the EU 
legislative process. 
The dilemma of promoting competition in services 
based on access (whether to old copperwire networks 
or to NGANs) versus infrastructure competition 
(which tends to be more sustainable, though up-front 
far more costly especially for fibre and even more so 
in areas with less density) loomed large in the third 
package debates. As in all network industries, the 
installed base may impose path-dependencies in 
policies from which it is hard (and costly) to escape. 
Thus, in EU countries with little or no cable, 
investment in new infrastructure may well have been 
throttled precisely by generous access regulation. This 
negative relation between infra investment and TPA 
(third party access) has been demonstrated repeatedly 
in the empirical economic literature.
14 It is therefore 
understandable that some telcos pleaded to mimic the 
temporary exemption from TPA in the gas sector used 
to stimulate new pipelines investment. These 
‘regulatory holidays’ in gas, however, do not fit the 
EU telecoms model of the second package and have 
indeed later been forbidden by the Court of Justice of 
the EU.
15 This can only mean that the ‘investment 
ladder’ approach has to be successful, but that is made 
increasingly difficult with the risky and high capital 
costs of investment in NGANs. Moreover, such 
NGANs have fewer access options in the first place. 
In this context, a debate on ‘functional separation’ (a 
kind of management unbundling, without ownership 
unbundling) emerged as an extreme remedy in case of 
proven, lingering problems of access to incumbents' 
networks. New or not,
16 from the perspective of the 
internal market and e-communications players eager 
to develop EU-wide strategies, having functional 
separation imposed in one EU country and not in 
another can easily render such European approaches 
very problematic. It is anything but obvious that the 
single market is improved by such selective and 
country-by-country measures.  
Interestingly, the Commission developed ‘guidance’ 
(a soft regulatory approach) outside the 2002 telecoms 
framework by means of a Recommendation on 
NGAs, adopted on 20 September 2010. The stated 
purpose of the NGA Recommendation is the 
development of the internal market by enhancing 
legal certainty and promoting investment, competition 
and innovation with respect to NGA.
17 It boils down 
to a risk premium (between 10% and 15%) in the 
cost-price calculations underlying access pricing to 
NGA infrastructure., something that many operators 
considered insufficient to encourage any massive 
investment in NGA infrastructure. Indeed, the 
regulatory overlap between the copper networks and 
                                                      
14 See for example Waverman et al. (2007), Wallsten 
(2007), Wallsten & Hausladen (2009), Grajek & Roeller 
(2009) and Pietrunti (2008).  
15 C-424/07, Commission v. Germany; judgment of 3 
December 2009. 
16 See Renda (2009) and Renda (2008, pp. 13-14).  
17 See the Draft Recommendation at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_cons
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remedies for NGAs may well have exacerbated the 
legal uncertainty surrounding the issue.
18 
The EU governance debate should of course be about 
the single market. It is the single market imperative 
that might justify centralising decision-making and 
conflict resolution.
19 If the promotion of competition 
mainly in national e-communications markets is the 
overriding aim, all one would need are hard indicators 
to analyse local competition and concomitant powers 
for NRAs (and /or local competition authorities) to 
realize it. The Commission proposed veto power for 
the Commission on (national) remedies, besides a 
new EU-level Agency called EECMA (later, BEREC) 
for the NRAs jointly and deeper analysis. The 
Commission's objective was merely to obtain greater 
assurance of consistency in measures and remedies at 
the national level by greater ‘Europeanisation’ of 
NRAs and more centralisation (merely) of analytical 
and support functions in EECMA. The Council 
basically resisted any weakening of NRAs by 
significant ‘Europeanisation’ and the European 
Parliament rejected EECMA first of all because it was 
seen as oversized, yet merely advisory, while 
presumably diluting the European Parliament's 
influence. As concluded in Renda (2009, p. 15), 
“BEREC is essentially the same as the ERG. It has no 
legal personality, it is not an EU Agency, it does not 
include the competences that are reserved to ENISA 
and it does not have any significant competence on 
spectrum issues”. The single e-communications 
market seems to have been forgotten in the heat of the 
pointless power struggle. One can only venture some 
hope that BEREC will eventually yield greater 
‘Europeanisation’ of the mindsets of NRAs.  
On obtaining EU-level decision-making power on 
spectrum – e.g. designated bands to be harmonised for 
pan-European services – when relevant for the better 
functioning of the internal e-communications market, 
the member states have been defensive at best. 
Moreover, the EP was irritated by the lack of any 
proposed EP (as against proposed Commission) 
influence in the spectrum area. One might suspect that 
a degree of capture (by e.g. broadcasters) of national 
governments explains the resistance in Council, if not 
in the EP. Nonetheless, the failure to develop 
European digital services will not be easily overcome 
and the digital dividend is not exploited in some EU 
countries. True, the Commission has successfully 
pursued a strategy of more flexible methods of 
spectrum management (see Cave & Minervini, 2009, 
                                                      
18 Cave & Shortall (2010) state that legal certainty "is the 
one area where the Commission has not only failed but in 
fact may aggravate the problem".  
19 See Pelkmans (1998), Pelkmans & Young (1998, ch. 10) 
and Pelkmans (2005) for a fully developed functional 
subsidiarity test for the EU. 
for detail) but how helpful this can be for the internal 
market remains to be seen.  
In one area the EU level has acted firmly: cross-
border roaming, be it outside the 2002 e-
communications framework. Roaming charges had 
been shown to remain extremely far above underlying 
costs whilst joint dominance was hard to prove. 
Precisely in a domain of EU activity (namely, cross-
border) where voluntary agreement between NRAs 
cannot be the proper institutional approach as they are 
nationally oriented, a ‘need-to-act-in-common’ (as the 
subsidiarity test has it) is indispensable. The EU 
adopted a uniquely draconian Regulation on mobile 
voice, later followed by data services (including films, 
music, etc.). EU-wide price controls in network 
industries, indeed, in almost all sectors other than 
selected agricultural goods, are unheard of. Pursuing a 
properly functioning internal market cannot normally 
be based on such regulatory intrusion but on the 
efficiency-improving outcomes of dynamic 
competition processes. Alas, EU consumers and users 
could not rely on the latter for cost-oriented prices of 
roaming.  
2.3  Will the Digital Agenda realize the 
Digital Single Market? 
The May 2010 Commission proposals on the EU 
Digital Agenda
20 are incomparably more ambitious 
than i2010 or its predecessor. Table 1 constitutes a 
selection of those proposed measures that help 
establish or improve the Single Digital Market.  
A Single Digital Market would widen the approach of 
e-communications, still heavily supply-side oriented, 
to digital demand questions that need to be resolved 
for a single market to work properly. Stronger, the 
dynamics of using new, innovative services as well as 
the incentives to generate more of such new services 
in the EU are throttled by numerous barriers, 
incompatibilities and uncertainties.  
The supply side of (new) infrastructure and 
competitive supply of (e.g. bundled) services interacts 
of course with these demand aspects, and increasingly 
so with convergence and digital progress. All 19 
Agenda items listed in Table 1 would have to be 
proposed within 2½ years, a tall order. The critical 
measures include: i) pan-European licensing for on-
line rights management, ii) strengthening EU data 
protection rights of consumers, iii), updating the e-
commerce directive, and with it the e-Signature 
directive as well as ensure interoperability of secure e-
Authentication systems, realizing mutual recognition 
of e-identification and authorisation across the EU 
                                                      
20 COM (2010) 245 of 19 May 2010. A Digital Agenda for 
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and an EU-wide Online Dispute Resolution system; 
iv) a contract law instrument, complementing the 
Consumer Rights Directive; v) harmonising of 
numbering resources so as to finally enable the 
provision of business services across Europe; vi) a 
decision by EP & Council on a European Spectrum 
Policy Programme; and not least, vii) the long-
awaited Recommendation to encourage investment in 
competitive NGA networks.  
Table 1. Actions foreseen by the Digital Agenda 
Commission legislative action/proposals  Planned  
Delivery  
A vibrant digital single market   
Propose a framework Directive on collective rights management, establishing pan-European 
licensing for (online) rights management 
2010 
Propose a Directive on orphan works to facilitate digitisation and dissemination of cultural 
works in Europe 
2010 
Review the EU data protection regulatory framework, to enhance individuals' confidence 
and strengthening their rights 
2010 
Make proposals updating the e-Commerce Directive for online markets   2010 
Propose measures to make Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) migration obligatory by a 
future fixed date 
2010 
Review the eSignature Directive to ensure cross-border recognition and interoperability of 
secure eAuthentication systems 
2011 
Propose a contract law instrument complementing the Consumer Rights Directive  2011 
Propose measures for an increased harmonisation of numbering resources for provision of 
business services across Europe 
2011 
Report on the review of the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights  2012 
Report on the need for additional measures needed to promote cross-border and pan-
European licences 
2012 
Review the Directive on Re-Use of Public Sector Info, notably its scope and principles on 
charging for access and use 
2012 
Propose an EU-wide Online Dispute Resolution system for eCommerce transactions  2012 
Trust and security   
Propose legal measures to combat cyber attacks  2010 
Propose rules on jurisdiction in cyberspace at European and international levels  2013 
Fast and ultra fast internet access  
Propose a decision by the European Parliament and Council on a European Spectrum Policy 
Programme for more efficient management of radio spectrum 
2010 
Issue a Recommendation to encourage investment in competitive NGA networks  2010 
ICT-enabled benefits for EU society   
Review the Public Access to Environmental Information Directive  2011 
Issue a Recommendation on digitisation of European cinema  2011 
Propose a Council and Parliament Decision requesting member states to ensure mutual 
recognition of e-identification and authentication across the EU based on online 
‘authentication services’ 
2012 
 
 
Together with the remaining – welcome although less 
critical – nine proposals, the Digital Single Market 
would receive the major stimulus many business 
actors and consumers have been insisting on for years. 
A recent study (Copenhagen Economics, 2010) finds 
that a realisation of the Digital Single Market could 
have an EU GNP boost of 4.1%, quite apart from the 
dynamic incentives leading to innovation and new 
services, if not additional investments (which are 
exceedingly hard to simulate). The Commission is to 
be commended for squarely giving unreserved priority 
to the route towards an EU Digital Single Market.  
3. Conclusions   
The success of EU e-communications liberalisation, 
combined with regulation and competition policy, 
consists in creating a far more conducive environment 
for drastic price reductions, made possible by rapid 
technological change, and for consumer-
responsiveness, innovation and a high rate of 
investment driving new services and, recently, new 
advanced infrastructure. However, the benefits 
experienced by all and the dynamics of the sector 
have concealed significant structural flaws in the EU 10 | Pelkmans & Renda 
digital regulatory model. There is no such thing as an 
EU digital single market, whether on the supply or 
demand side. Not only is the building of that internal 
market the central mandate of the treaty to the EU 
level, it is ever more costly for the European economy 
to do without.  
Although the general claim that an internal market is 
lacking has of course been made before, not least by 
the Commission, it is only when one employs 
systematically a ‘single market lens’ that one begins 
to realize what a curious and poor construct the EU e-
communications and digital framework still is today! 
Price disparities abound and are profound, at times 
absurd, as well as lingering; non-price indicators of 
fragmentation are adding more discomfort. 
Reconsidering the three regulatory packages of 1998, 
2002 and 2009, again focusing solely on the internal 
market aspects, demonstrates that the EU has first 
neglected the single market dimension, and later 
failed to address it in a meaningful way. It is only the 
very recent EU Digital Agenda that squarely tackles 
the lack of a single digital market, in particular on the 
demand side. It is high time that Council and the EP 
begin to appreciate the urgency and economic 
importance of restoring the core mandate of the treaty. 
When the EU legislature will finally realize what they 
have (not) done, we offer them two further thoughts to 
consider in earnest. 
First, is there any serious economic, institutional or 
treaty rationale for maintaining an EU e-
communications framework that consists of 
stimulating competition in national, fragmented 
markets? Economically, the EU misses out on a major 
set of incentives for pan-European services, which 
currently (13 years after Telecoms-1998) are 
practically non-existent. An EU single market is 
equally critical for innovation in services and for 
building advanced infrastructure requiring a better 
perspective of user demand for such new services. 
Institutionally, NRAs have, almost by definition, a 
profound vested interest to maintain the current 
splintered set-up of the EU 'internal' market, if not 
showing a strong inclination to define relevant 
markets as if national borders (should) matter. The 
TFEU does not mandate EU legislative bodies or, for 
that matter, the Commission, to foster competition 
inside national markets, but literally and solely in the 
EU internal market. 
Second, the current narrow formulation of the Meroni 
doctrine is simply inconsistent with the emergence 
and permanent proper functioning of the internal 
market in a network industry like e-communications. 
In the treaty logic, with the overriding (intermediate) 
purpose of constructing a properly functioning 
internal market so as to serve the higher aims of the 
TFEU (such as economic growth), a network sector 
cannot be expected to integrate over the entire EU 
economy as ordinary goods and services markets do. 
It does require somewhat greater centralisation. By 
assuming an absolutist constitutional view on the 
disallowed delegation to independent EU Agencies, 
without noting the glaring inconsistency with building 
the internal (e-communications) market – the 
principal ‘means’ to make the treaty work – one fails 
to consider proven, alternative ways of solving this 
dilemma (as, for example, some federations have 
done with framework laws and mechanisms of 
accountability to the legislator). When, nowadays, EU 
Agencies  are set up, they suffer from enormous 
institutional complexity and narrow mandates, 
remaining at best somewhat autonomous in the 
presence of 27 national regulators! In e-
communications, even that poor status has not been 
accomplished. Every OECD country and many other 
countries have an independent regulator for e-
communications, yet, mysteriously, the EU expects a 
well-functioning internal market to come about 
without a common independent regulator (and the 
Commission can only partly fill the gap). 
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